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Abstract 
Ethnocentrism is a behavioral strategy seen on every scale of social interaction. Game-
theory models demonstrate that evolution selects ethnocentrism because it boosts 
cooperation, which increases reproductive fitness. However, some believe that interethnic 
unions have the potential to foster universal cooperation and overcome in-group biases in 
humans. Here, we use agent-based computer simulations to test this hypothesis. 
Cooperative intergroup mating does lend an advantage to a universal cooperation strategy 
when the cost/benefit ratio of cooperation is low and local population diversity is high.  
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Introduction  
Ethnocentrism is a behavioral strategy in which individuals cooperate with members of their own 
group, but not with outsiders [1]. In-group favoritism is seen on every scale of social interaction, 
from the geopolitical [2] to the interpersonal [1]. In humans, its consequences are severe: ethnic 
clashes characterize 75% of armed conflicts since the end of the Cold War [2], highlighting the 
importance of addressing ethnocentric tendencies.   
Empirical observations suggest that ethnocentrism is a fundamental cooperative strategy. 
In-group preference in humans can be activated through arbitrary group tags, with little social or 
biological relevance [3, 4]. Nor do such biases require complex cognitive capacity, as they can 
be observed among microbes [5], plants [6], and insects [7].  
Game theoretic research on symmetric games such as prisoner’s dilemma (PD) shows 
that mutual defection is an evolutionary stable strategy in well-mixed populations, because a 
player can achieve better fitness payoffs by defecting, regardless of what the other player does 
[8]. Empirical and theoretical work shows that cooperation can evolve by either direct [9-11] or 
indirect reciprocity (based on reputation) [12, 13], but only if the game is indefinitely repeated. 
Evolution of cooperation in one-off PD games can occur via some kind of group structure, based 
on either spatial connections [14, 15] or tags that probabilistically identify agent kinship or 
similarity [16, 17]. Multi-level selection can also favor groups that cooperate within the group 
and compete across groups [18, 19]. In evolutionary simulations with identifiable group tags, 
ethnocentric agents out-compete humanitarians (universal cooperators) by defecting against 
altruistic members of other groups [16, 17]. This strengthens both within-group cooperation and 
between-group competition, providing ethnocentrism with a powerful evolutionary impetus. 
Evolutionary simulations also show that diminishing in-group biases hinder cooperative behavior 
[20].  
However, models that rely on evolutionary game theory often ignore some relevant real-
world behaviors [21]. Mate selection is one such behavior. Humans show a tendency towards 
ethnocentric mate selection, choosing mates who are similar to themselves genetically [22, 23], 
religiously [24], and in personality [25]. In turn, assortative mating, based on similarity, may 
strengthen ethnocentrism by accentuating genetic differences [26-28], decreasing mobility 
between groups [29], and sustaining cultural differentiation [30]. The causal relationship 
between ethnocentric mate selection and more general ethnocentric behavior has not been 
explored. Nor can it be taken for granted that assortative mating is simply a byproduct of general 
ethnocentric tendencies. In fact, primate researchers have recently suggested a reverse causality, 
whereby the evolutionary advantages of cooperative breeding may lead to the evolution of 
general cooperative behaviors [31]. This suggests that the fitness of cooperative behaviors is 
directly influenced by their success in mating contexts. While ethnocentrism has been thoroughly 
tested for evolutionary fitness in non-mating contexts, it has not, to our knowledge, been tested 
in a mating context. This would add a layer of complexity to the evolution of ethnocentrism, by 
introducing the potential for intergroup mating and multi-group identities. Some researchers have 
speculated that these factors could undermine ethnocentrism by introducing diversity into local 
kinship networks [32, 33].   
By extending agent-based computer simulations that have previously been used to study 
ethnocentric behavior [16, 17], we test the evolutionary fitness of ethnocentric mate selection. 
Rather than reproducing agents via the usual technique of cloning, agents in our simulations 
mate and exchange genetic material. We explore intergroup mating and offspring identities for 
their potential effects on the evolution of cooperative behavior, with some emphasis on the 
relative success of ethnocentric and humanitarian strategies. We discuss our results in light of 
current ideas about interethnic mating in humans. 
 
Methods  
We extend agent-based computer simulations [16, 17] to accommodate mating. The simulation 
begins with an empty 50x50 toroid lattice. Forty-eight agents with the same group tag are placed 
into random locations within each quadrant of the lattice, such that each quadrant initially 
contains agents from one group only. These initial agents are randomly assigned one of four 
cooperative strategies. Agents who cooperate with agents in their in-group and their out-group 
are called humanitarian. Agents who cooperate only with agents in their in-group, but not agents 
in their out-group, are termed ethnocentric. Agents who cooperate only with agents in their out-
group are labeled traitorous. Finally, agents who cooperate with no other agents are designated 
selfish. The simulation iterates through evolutionary cycles in which agents interact, reproduce, 
and die. One thousand evolutionary cycles are run for each simulation, by which time population 
genotypes have stabilized. 
 During the interaction phase, agents engage in a one-off prisoner’s dilemma game with 
each of their Moore neighbors (Figure 1). The outcome of each game for each agent is the 
benefit of receiving cooperation minus the cost of giving cooperation (see Table 1). This net 
outcome is added to each agent’s reproductive potential. To vary the critical cost/benefit ratio, 
we fix benefit at .1 and vary cost from .01 to .1 in ten steps of .01.  
 
 
Figure 1. At each evolutionary cycle, each agent plays a PD game with each of its adjacent 
neighbors. The agent plays according to its inherited cooperative strategy (humanitarian, 
ethnocentric, traitorous, or selfish). The outcome of the game slightly modifies the agent’s 
reproductive potential. In the next phase, agents have an opportunity to reproduce. An agent 
mates with a neighboring agent if at least one of them is a willing cooperator. In the Figure, 
direction of cooperation is indicated by small arrows, and group tags are represented by 
background color. Parents produce an offspring with a probability corresponding to their mean 
reproductive potential. Offspring are placed in a neighboring empty cell. Agents die with a 
probability corresponding to the death rate. Dead agents are removed.  
  
During the reproduction phase, agents are paired randomly with one of their Moore 
neighbors. If at least one agent is a willing cooperator, the pair mates with a probability equal to 
their average reproductive potential. Requiring mutual cooperation for mating produces 
qualitatively similar results, the only exception being that selfishness quickly goes to extinction. 
Offspring are placed in an empty location in the parents’ Moore neighborhood.  
 
Table 1. Outcomes, in terms of cost and benefit, for Agent 1 in a PD game between Agent 1 and 
Agent 2. The outcome is added to Agent 1’s reproductive potential. 
 Agent 2 
Agent 1 Cooperate Defect 
Cooperate b - c -c 
Defect b 0 
 
Offspring agents’ cooperation traits and group tags are inherited from their parent agents. 
In-group and out-group cooperation traits are each inherited from one of the two parents, 
randomly selected. We tested three different classification schemes for multiethnic agents, based 
on human classification of mixed-race individuals [34, 35]. In the Either/Or condition, mixed 
offspring inherit one identity from one or the other randomly-selected parent. In the Both and 
Neither conditions, parent agents’ tags are averaged together to create a multiethnic tag. For 
example, if a Group 1 agent is labeled with a vector [1 0 0 0] and a Group 2 agent is labeled with 
a vector [0 1 0 0], their offspring would have a tag of [.5 .5 0 0]. In the next generation, an agent 
with a tag of [.5 .5 0 0] could mate with an agent with a tag of [0 1 0 0] to produce an offspring 
with a tag of [.25 .75 0 0].  
The Neither and Both conditions differ in the way these multiethnic agents are grouped. 
In the Neither condition, the agents must share the same ancestry to be considered in the same 
group. In the Both condition, agents need to share only some of the same ancestry to be 
considered in the same group (Figure 2). If less than one quarter of an agents’ ancestry originates 
from a particular group, that portion of its ancestry is ignored during the classification process.  
We do not adhere to binary Mendelian genetics in the Both and Neither conditions 
because ethnicity is not a Mendelian trait that can be traced to a single gene locus. Rather, 
ethnicity is an amalgam of genetically and culturally transmitted markers. Thus, blended 
inheritance is an appropriate, if simplistic, model of the way ethnicity can be inherited in 
humans. 
At the end of each reproductive phase, all reproductive potentials are reset to a base of 
.12. At the end of each cycle, agents die at a rate of .01. Results are obtained by averaging each 
dependent measure (strategy type, behaviors, and intergroup borders) across the last 100 cycles 
in each of ten independent simulations. 
 
  
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2. Sample interactions for each offspring-identification scheme. In the Both and Neither 
conditions, multiethnic offspring are generated when agents with different tags mate with one 
another. The parents’ tags are averaged together, as described in the text. In the Both condition, 
these offspring are classified with any other agents having Group 1 or Group 2 ancestry. In the 
Neither condition, the offspring are classified only with agents having Group 1 and Group 2 
ancestry. In the Either condition, agents inherit only one tag from one random parent, precluding 
the existence of multiethnic agents. Check marks indicate cooperation; x indicates defection.  
 
Results 
Each of three dependent measures (strategy proportions of the population, proportion of 
cooperative behaviors, and number of intergroup borders) is subjected to a repeated-measures 
ANOVA with offspring ID and cost/benefit ratio as independent factors. For ANOVA of 
strategies, the four genotypic strategies serve as a repeated measure. The ten replications play the 
statistical role of subjects in strategy ANOVAs.  
In the ANOVA of strategy proportions, between-replication effects include small main 
effects of ID and c/b ratio, but no interaction. All of the within-replication effects are large (see 
Table 2 for details). A partial eta squared (η2) value above .26 is conventionally considered to 
indicate a large effect.  
Means and standard errors for these effects are presented in Figure 3, plotted separately 
for the Offspring IDs of Either (3A), Neither (3B), and Both (3C). As a general heuristic, non-
overlapping SE bars around each of two means indicate that these two means differ significantly 
from each other by various multiple comparison procedures. Thus in this paper, standard error 
bars provide a useful graphical indicator of statistical significance for the difference between any 
two means in a figure.  
For IDs of Either and Neither, c/b ratios of .4 and higher yield the familiar ethnocentric 
dominance. But with lower c/b ratios, there is clear humanitarian dominance. As shown in Figure 
3C, the Both ID condition yields a pattern of consistent ethnocentric dominance except at the 
highest two c/b values, where selfish genotypes are most prevalent. Interestingly, intergroup 
borders nearly disappear in the Both condition, as illustrated in Figure 4. All factors in the 
factorial ANOVA of intergroup borders are significant at p < .001 (see Table 3 for details). In 
essence, the Both ID scheme eventually creates a single homogenous group, as in the melting pot 
metaphor. The role of homogeneity in fostering ethnocentrism is discussed later in this section. 
 
Table 2. ANOVA Effects for Strategy Proportions 
Factor F df p < η2 
ID 4.09 2, 270 .05 .029 
c/b 2.52 9, 270 .01 .077 
ID x c/b 1.08 18, 270 .368 .067 
Strategy 3428  3, 810 .001 .927 
Strategy x ID 61 6, 810 .001 .312 
Strategy x c/b 237 27, 810 .001 .888 
Strategy x ID x c/b 33 54, 810 .001 .690 
 
The factorial ANOVA of proportion of cooperative behaviors shows large effects at p < 
.001 for ID and cost/benefit, as well as their interaction (see Table 4 for details). Means and SE 
bars are plotted in Figure 5, where it can be seen that cooperation drops off with increasing c/b 
ratio but never falls below .5. At low levels of c/b ratio, cooperation is quite high.  
In order to draw a close comparison to a previous simulation which found that 
cooperation decreased under humanitarian dominance [20], we focus on two levels of c/b, one of 
which yields substantial humanitarian dominance (.2) while the other yields substantial 
ethnocentric dominance (.6) (see Figures 3A and 3B). The relevant means and SE bars are 
plotted in Figure 6 and the ANOVA details are shown in Table 5. At a c/b ratio of .2, there is 
strong humanitarian dominance and a higher level of cooperation as compared to the strong 
ethnocentric dominance and a lower level of cooperation at a c/b ratio of .6. This is a strong 
difference in the opposite direction from the previous simulation that used increased cognitive 
cost for conditional strategies like ethnocentrism [20]. Our cooperative intergroup mating 
technique produces humanitarian dominance and even higher levels of cooperation than is 
evident when ethnocentrics are dominant.     
The general similarity between the Neither and Either ID conditions across strategies 
(Figures 3A and 3B) and behaviors (Figures 5 and 6) indicates that the presence of agents with 
multiethnic identities has no effect on genotypic strategies or the amount of cooperation that they 
produce. Whereas agents are able to form unique, multiethnic identities in the Neither condition, 
no multiethnic identities exist in the Either condition. This lack of difference between these two 
conditions in our simulations contradicts claims from correlational evidence with humans that 
the one-drop rule, which retains strict Either/Or identities for multiethnic individuals [36], 
encourages ethnocentrism more than other identification schemes [37]. Furthermore, these 
results suggest that intergroup mating itself, not the presence of multiethnic individuals, favors 
humanitarianism over ethnocentrism.  
Three control conditions are included to isolate the key conditions for producing 
humanitarian cooperation. Each of these controls eliminates one aspect of cooperative intergroup 
mating in order to identify what is required to produce humanitarian dominance. One control 
condition eliminates mating, another eliminates intergroup mating, and the third eliminates 
cooperative mating by having agents mate randomly with one of their Moore neighbors. For 
simplicity, the Either ID scheme is used for all control conditions. This allows examination of 
the effects of mating alone, without the presence of mixed-tag offspring. ANOVAs include the 
Either ID condition with cooperative intergroup mating (Figure 3A). Detailed ANOVA results 
are presented in Table 6 for strategies and in Table 7 for cooperative behaviors. Plots of means 
and SEs are presented in Figure 7 for strategies and Figure 8 for behaviors.  
Table 6 indicates large and significant main and interaction effects for Strategy. Table 7 
shows large, significant main effects for Condition and c/b, as well as for their interaction. 
Recall that cooperative intergroup mating evolves humanitarian dominance at low c/b 
levels (Figure 3a) that does not diminish cooperation compared to ethnocentric dominance at 
higher c/b levels (Figures 5 and 6). None of the three control conditions yield any humanitarian 
dominance at any c/b level (Figure 7), confirming that, for humanitarian dominance, there must 
be mating (7A), that mating must be allowed to occur across group borders (7B), and it must be 
cooperative (7C).  
In the cloning condition, ethnocentrism gives way to selfishness as the c/b ratio increases 
(7A). When mating is not allowed across group boundaries, selfishness also increases at higher 
c/b ratios, but does not displace ethnocentrism (7B). When mating is random, rather than 
cooperative, selfishness prevails at c/b ratios of .6 to 1 (7C). Again, all three components of 
cooperative intergroup mating must be present for the predominance of a humanitarian pattern of 
cooperation. 
Figure 8 similarly shows that, for all conditions, cooperative behavior diminishes as c/b 
ratios increase. The main effect of condition is very strong, with lack of intergroup mating 
producing the most cooperation, followed in order by cooperative intergroup mating, cloning, 
and random mating. This ordering suggests that cooperative mating by itself, even if restricted to 
in-group members, fosters cooperation.  
Number of intergroup borders is positively correlated with proportion of humanitarian 
agents and negatively correlated with the proportion of ethnocentric agents in the population. 
This is true in both the Neither and Either Offspring ID conditions (see Table 8 for details). Also, 
humanitarians have more intergroup borders than do ethnocentric agents. This is revealed in 
factorial ANOVAs with independent factors of c/b and strategy (humanitarian vs. ethnocentric). 
There is a strong main effect of strategy in both the Neither, F(1, 180) = 136, p < .001, η2 = .431, 
and Either, F(1, 180) = 926, p < .001, η2 =.837, Offspring ID conditions. We omit the Both 
Offspring ID from these two analyses because intergroup borders tend to disappear in that 
condition (Figure 4). It is worth noting that humanitarianism also tends to disappear in the Both 
condition, in favor of ethnocentrism. 
 
  
 
Figure 3. Mean strategy proportions of total population as a function of Offspring ID and c/b. 
Humanitarian dominance occurs in the Either and Neither conditions at lower c/b levels.  
 
Figure 4. Mean number of intergroup borders as a function of Offspring ID and c/b ratio. 
Intergroup borders nearly disappear in the Both condition, indicating a homogeneous population.  
 
 
Table 3. ANOVA Results for Intergroup Borders 
Factor F df η2 
ID 2812 2, 270 .954 
c/b 34 9, 270 .534 
ID x c/b 15 18, 270 .497 
 
 
Table 4. ANOVA Results for Proportion of Cooperative Behaviors 
Factor F df η2 
ID 112 2, 270 .453 
c/b 1623 9, 270 .982 
ID x c/b 38 18, 270 .716 
 
 
Figure 5. Cooperative behavior as a function of ID and c/b. Cooperation is generally high but 
decreases as c/b rises. 
 
 
Figure 6. Cooperative behavior as a function of ID re-plotted from Figure 5 at two levels of c/b. 
Cooperation is higher under humanitarian dominance (at c/b = .2) than under ethnocentric 
dominance (at c/b = .6).  
 
Table 5. ANOVA Results for Proportion of Cooperative Behaviors at Two c/b Levels 
Factor F df p < η2 
ID 63 2, 54 .001 .701 
c/b 844 1, 54 .001 .940 
ID x c/b .87 2, 54 .424 .031 
 
  
Table 6. ANOVA Effects for Strategy Proportions in Control Conditions 
Factor F df p < η2 
Condition 2.09  3, 360 .101 0.017 
c/b .94 9, 360 .487 0.023 
Condition x c/b .86 27, 360 .662 0.061 
Strategy 5509  3, 1080 .001 .939 
Strategy x Condition 977 9, 1080 .001 .891 
Strategy x c/b 262 27, 1080 .001 .868 
Strategy x Condition x c/b 69 81, 1080 .001 .837 
 
 
Table 7. ANOVA Results for Proportion of Cooperative Behaviors in Control Conditions 
Factor F df p < η2 
Condition 4686 3, 360 .001 .975 
c/b 1234 9, 360 .001 .969 
Condition x c/b 70 27, 360 . 001 .840 
 
  
  
  
 
 
Figure 7. Strategy results for control conditions that eliminate mating (A), intergroup mating (B), 
or cooperative mating (C) establish that intergroup cooperative mating is critical for 
humanitarian dominance. 
 
 
Figure 8. Mean proportions of cooperative behaviors for cooperative intergroup mating and three 
control conditions that eliminate mating, intergroup mating, or cooperative mating. Cooperative 
mating enhances general cooperation, whether across or within group boundaries. Cooperation 
decreases with rising c/b.  
 
 
Table 8. Pearson Correlations of Number of Intergroup Borders with Proportions of Ethnocentric 
and Humanitarian Agents in the Population under Cooperative Intergroup Mating 
 
Offspring ID Strategy r n df p < 
Neither Ethnocentric -0.524 100 98 0.01 
Neither Humanitarian 0.511 100 98 0.01 
Either Ethnocentric -0.173 100 98 0.10 
Either Humanitarian 0.757 100 98 0.01 
 
 
Discussion 
In our framework, cooperative intergroup mating favors humanitarian strategies under conditions 
of low cost/benefit ratios and high local diversity. Control conditions show that this effect is 
driven by the prevalence of cooperative intergroup mating. When offspring are cloned or when 
intergroup mating is prohibited, ethnocentrism dominates over humanitarianism. When mating is 
not cooperative, there is either ethnocentric dominance (at low c/b ratios) or selfish dominance 
(at high c/b ratios). Thus, humanitarian dominance requires cooperative mating across group 
lines.  
Cooperative behavior drops off as c/b ratios increase. Intergroup mating produces the 
most cooperation, followed in order by cooperative intergroup mating, cloning, and random 
mating. Thus, cooperative mating by itself fosters cooperation.  
Our results highlight the need to incorporate real behaviors into evolutionary simulations. 
Models that rely exclusively on cooperative-competitive games are appealing in their simplicity, 
but can miss crucial dynamics at play in the real world [21, 38]. In the present case, traditional 
models focus on agents’ reproductive fitness to calculate the success of a cooperative strategy. 
However, if mate selection and cooperative strategies are linked, as in our simulations, then 
cooperation has a direct effect on an agent’s reproductive outcome, in addition to its effect on 
reproductive fitness. In light of this, mate selection can be a potentially powerful force in 
determining evolutionary outcomes.  
Whether reproductive behavior can be accurately modeled using cooperative games 
remains a point of contention among biologists [39-41], and it seems simplistic to reduce a 
behavior as complex as mate selection to a decision to cooperate. Nevertheless, reproductive and 
cooperative behaviors do appear to be tightly coupled. Previous modeling research suggests that 
social interactions have a strong effect on mating behavior, such that assortative mating may 
evolve as a consequence of ethnocentric cooperation [42]. Our work extends this finding by 
establishing a reverse causality, in which mate selection strategies alter the evolutionary course 
of cooperation. This is analogous to recent findings that several primate species, including 
humans, are particularly altruistic towards their conspecifics if they have an evolutionary 
tendency towards cooperative parenting [31]. Although cooperative mating and cooperative 
parenting are somewhat distinct, they do share the idea that cooperative procreation leads to 
more general cooperation. Future work could shed additional light on these processes by 
replicating our simulations on graph structures that are amenable to analytical methods.  
Our model delineates the conditions under which intergroup mating, and subsequently 
humanitarianism, becomes advantageous. First, when the cost/benefit ratio of cooperation 
decreases, it removes the need for ethnocentric bias to ameliorate the costs of cooperation. In 
studies of human interethnic couples, marriage can be treated as a mutually beneficial exchange 
of social and economic resources [41, 43-45]. Unions occur when the cost/benefit ratio is 
minimal for both parties. Our work predicts that mate choice is more likely to cross ethnic lines 
if the coupling yields a low cost/benefit ratio. This could occur if, for example, both parties 
possess high socioeconomic status [43]. Indeed, studies of interethnic marriage find that high-
income individuals are more likely to marry across ethnic groups than their low-income 
counterparts [44]. Thus, improvements in socioeconomic status may facilitate interethnic 
coupling and humanitarian cooperation strategies. Reductions in the social cost of interethnic 
marriage, in the form of anti-discrimination legislation, could also prove beneficial. 
We find that prevalence of intergroup borders is related positively to humanitarianism 
and negatively to ethnocentrism. Although direction of causality is difficult to ascertain here, it 
seems reasonable that causal influence would flow in both directions. Humanitarian parents tend 
to produce humanitarian offspring, regardless of group tags, thus increasing the number of 
intergroup borders. Ethnocentric parents tend to produce ethnocentric offspring of the same 
group tag, thus creating a more homogeneous neighborhood. In the reverse direction, intergroup 
borders limit mating opportunities for ethnocentric but not for humanitarian agents. It is well 
known that propinquity is an important aspect of mate selection [45, 46]. In particular, 
availability plays an important role in the formation of human interethnic unions, with interethnic 
couples more likely to form in multiethnic neighborhoods [47]. The role of neighborhood 
diversity in improving inter-group relations has been noted in surveys of humans [48].  
We show how evolution can overcome ethnocentrism in favor of the more universal 
cooperation pattern of humanitarianism. Evolution by itself can achieve humanitarian dominance 
under a conjunction of conditions: low cost/benefit ratios and the opportunity for cooperative 
intergroup mating. In this context, evolution-based humanitarianism could be facilitated by 
social policies that encourage neighborhood diversity and raise the benefit and/or lower the cost 
of cooperative intergroup mating. Advantages of such evolutionary solutions are that they could 
be more enduring and less in conflict with competing evolutionary tendencies such as 
ethnocentrism and selfishness.  
A big disadvantage of relying on evolution is that it typically takes a very long time. 
Societies interested in more immediate solutions may consider environmental interventions 
based, for example, on encouraging neighborhood diversity and positive contact across group 
lines, and penalizing discrimination. It seems important for considering such social interventions 
to not underestimate the apparent evolutionary strength of ethnocentric patterns of cooperation. 
Effective interventions may have to be strong and persistent to be worthwhile. The rapid demise 
of intergroup tolerance in the former Yugoslavia after the death of Tito can be cited as a 
compelling example [49, 50]. All of this implies that future research might fruitfully explore the 
undoubtedly complex interactions between evolution, social policy, and learning.  
In conclusion, ethnocentrism is difficult to minimize because it becomes genetically 
entrenched due to the fact that it keeps cooperation at a high level, which, in turn, enhances 
reproductive fitness. Social policies against ethnocentrism may fail to overcome these powerful 
evolutionary forces favoring ethnocentrism. Our simulations are the first to show that there can 
be an evolutionary pattern that favors universal over ethnocentric cooperation without lowering 
the overall level of cooperation. Finally, prolonged social policies could be designed to support 
that evolutionary solution.  
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